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Abstract. This paper develops a theoretical model for freight transport characterized by
competition between means of transport (the road and maritime sectors), where modes are
perceived as di erentiated products. Competitive behavior is assumed in the road freight
sector, and there are constant returns to scale. In contrast, the freight maritime sector is
characterized by oligopolistic behavior, where shipping lines enjoy economies of scale. The
market equilibrium where the shipping lines behave as prot maximizers, provides a rst
approximation to the determinants of market shares, prots, and user welfare. We then
characterize the equilibrium when horizontal integration of shipping lines occurs, with
and without further economies of scale. An empirical application to the routes Valencia-
Antwerp and Valencia-Genoa uncovers that the joint prot of the merged rms and social
welfare always increase. However, user surplus only increases when economies of scale are
signicantly exploited.
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027-01CAPM.1 Introduction
Total road freight transport in Europe is expected to grow by about 60% by 2013. This
growth would suppose an increase in the negative externalities caused by congestion, ac-
cidents, and environmental damage. Consequently, alternative modes to road transport
should be used more intensively than hitherto. In fact, seaborne trade in merchandise
goods, mainly carried by liner shipping, reached 29.1 trillion ton-miles by 2005. The
development of container shipping has certainly contributed to the increase in maritime
tra c, a market with a small number of big shipping lines. The objective of this paper
is to develop a freight transport model characterized by competition between road and
maritime transport; the model accounts for product di erentiation between the two modes
and for economies of scale in the shipping line market.
The liner shipping market has a number of characteristics, of which the following
stand out. First, there has been an increase in the size of rms and the emergence of
global carriers. The top 20 carriers accounted for 71% of vessel capacity deployed in 2005.
Second, mergers and cooperation agreements have been common in the past few years.
Since the 90s, the formation of strategic alliances permits carriers to pool vessels on main
commercial routes and prot from scope and network economies. Third, organising the
transport of freight by sea involves a number of di erent agents: freight forwarders, port
actors (cargo handlers, stevedores, and shipping agents), shipping companies and inland
transport providers. Containerization has paved the way not only to horizontal integration
but also to vertical integration in an e ort to improve the management of logistics chains.
Vertical integration can help companies to reap the benets of intermodal transport. De-
spite the increase in this type of structural moves, the biggest shipping lines remain the
key actors in transport chains. Fourth, the liner shipping industry exhibits economies of
scale, related to the size of the rm as well as to trade density. Fifth, shipping lines are
recently becoming more interested in the hinterland transportation sector. The door-to-
door service feature acknowledges the relevance of the combination of several transport
modes (sea, road, railroad) in the provision of a good service, which means not looking at
other transport modes only as competitors.
The model that we propose assumes competition for freight transport between the
road and the maritime sectors and captures quite a number of the features that char-
acterize the liner shipping market. In particular, we consider a route with two shipping
companies where road transport is supplied competitively. The services o ered by opera-
tors are perceived as di erentiated by shippers. The road transport sector does marginal
1cost pricing whereas the shipping companies hold market power and enjoy economies of
scale1. We begin by characterizing the equilibrium in this market environment. Results
can be intuitively presented in terms of parameters related with product di erentiation
and with the size of economies of scale. Then we study the e ects on fares and market
shares when the shipping lines merge (horizontal integration). This is done under two
possible scenarios, one with and one without any cost gains. The model is then applied
to the route Valencia-Genoa, where Bulcom Intramed Service and Turkon Container Line
are the two maritime operators. We use information on travel volumes, price elasticities,
and estimates of costs to recover the unknown parameters in the demand functions. We
may then study the e ects on tra c distribution, prices, prots, and welfare levels under
a horizontal integration move.
There is an extensive literature that studies di erent aspects of maritime transport.
The papers by Jansson and Shneerson (1985) and by Song et al. (2005) provide evi-
dence of economies of scale and of network economies, respectively. Heaver et al. (2000)
suggests that the extent and form of cooperative agreements, where shipping lines gure
prominently, has put them in an excellent negotiating position with port authorities. In
a sense, the shipping companies have become much stronger players relative to shippers,
stevedores and port authorities. Our model gives shipping lines a relevant role in a setting
with strategic price interaction and examines, theoretically and empirically, the e ects of
horizontal integration. A game-theoretical approach has recently been undertaken by De
Borger et al. (2008), who study duopolistic pricing by ports and optimal investment poli-
cies in port and hinterland capacity. The recent paper by Cariou (2008) o ers an overview
of the main trends in the liner shipping market during the last 15 years. The importance
of market power and the integration of activities in the maritime sector are made clear by
two recent OECD works by Frémont (2009) and Van de Voorde and Vanelslander (2009).
The main results can be summarized as follows. Whether maritime freight increases
after the merger is shown to depend on the existence of further economies of scale stemming
from the merger process. In case prices for maritime services increase, which occurs when
the merger only has strategic e ect, road freight transport also increases. Furthermore,
under some conditions, horizontal integration is found to be benecial in private and social
terms. The next Section presents the model and theoretical results. Section 3 develops an
1Panayides (2003) studies the strategy-performance relationship in ship management nding that
achieving economies of scale and di erentiation (through a wider range of services o ered) have a strong
inuence on performance. The increased emphasis on such relationship is due, among other things, to
intense competition (as evidenced by the trend in cooperation already mentioned).
2empirical application to the route Valencia-Genoa and Section 4 briey concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a connection between two regions,   and  . This connection can be established
by two ways. The rst one is a long haul truck link, denoted by    that transports the
goods from   to  , and the other is a combined transport mode in three legs, denoted
by  . The rst leg, a land leg, consists of a truck service delivering the goods from   to
one port     Then, a second leg is sea transport which is delivered by two di erentiated
shipping lines that carry the goods from port    to port    and nally a third land leg,
which consists of a truck service delivering the goods from    to  .2 Suppose that users
of this transport system consider the two modes   and   as substitutes and also consider
as di erentiated the services provided by the two shipping lines, denoted by  1 and  2. In
this way we model the demand for transport as a system of three linear demand functions
as follows:
   =         +  (  1 +   2)
  1 =        1 +  (   +   2) (1)
  2 =        2 +  (  1 +   )
where    is the demand (expressed in Tn-km) corresponding to service  , for   =   
 1  2  also    corresponds with the maximum level of transport demand for transport
mode   and nally,    is the total price for each mode. In particular,    is the truck
fare per Tn-km, so that     ,   =1  2 is the sum of the truck fares for the rst and third
legs,     and     respectively, and the shipping line fares also in Tn-km,      =1  2. We
next assume that the truck industries either the long haul or the other two that provide
shorter land services are competitive industries in the sense that the equilibrium price is
the competitive price, while the shipping line industry is a duopoly that sets prices in a
strategic way. Denote by   ,    and    the corresponding marginal costs of the long haul,
truck   and truck   industries. By the above assumption,    =    =       1 =    +    +   1
and   2 =    +   +  2  thus we can reformulate the above demand system by dening the
constant terms as follows:    =    +2  (   +   )  and   1 =   2 =      (1    )(   +   ) 
Further note that the system of demand equations must satisfy the condition saying that
an increase in the same amount of all prices must imply a decrease in demand; thus  
must be smaller than 1
2  Regarding the shipping line industry, we assume the following cost
2Roughly speaking, a maritime logistics chain consists of three large sections, the purely maritime
activities, goods handling in the port and hinterland transport services. Our model accounts for two of
them.
3functions:    (   )=         
2 2
    with    and   0  for   =1  2  which exhibit increasing
returns to scale.3 Thus, the extent of the returns to scale is parameterized by    and is
assumed that marginal cost are positive, that is         
  for all   
We are interested in nding the equilibrium prices, user surplus and social welfare of
the transport system and compare this equilibrium with the case where a merger takes
place in the shipping line industry, that is, after a horizontal integration move.
i) Initial situation equilibrium
Each shipping company chooses the prot maximizing price, so that shipping line  
maximizes     =                +  
2 2
    Computing the two rst order conditions we reach
the following system of equilibrium conditions   
   =
  
     
1     =1  2 and   
  =     obtaining
the following equilibrium prices:
  
   = (1  )
µ
2(   +    )   (1    )( 1 +  2) + (1 +  )(       )
2(1 + (1    )(1    ))
¶
+    for     =1  2 and   6=   
Note that if  2    1 then   
 2( 1   2)     
 1( 1   2)  and   
 1    1
  for nonnegative marginal
costs. At equilibrium.
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The second order condition for a maximum imposes that   2  while stability of
equilibrium requires that 0       2  
1    which is a more binding condition on    since  
cannot be negative. Therefore we assume that   1 
ii) Horizontal merger: shipping lines 1 and 2 merge.
When both shipping lines decide to merge, several post-merger situations can be
reached depending on the way the merger is capable of integrating the former separated
production processes. In one of the situations, the new entity sets prices to maximize prof-
its but both cost functions remain separate. In another, the merger can also internalize
the returns to scale due to the joint provision of products   1 and   2. In fact, the new
entity might even prot from synergies that meaning that the post-merger cost function
parameters would change so that  0  would be smaller or   higher or both things. In
the literature of horizontal mergers, the rst situation is usually associated with the case
where the merger only has strategic e ects by the internalization of competition among
3A linear marginal cost function reecting increasing returns to scale or tra c density has been employed
by Brueckner and Spiller (1991). Constant returns correspond to   =0 .
4shipping line companies. The second situation comprises both a strategic e ect and also
an e ciency gain due to further exploitation of scale economies, whereas the third case
also implies more e ciency because of cost improvements. In this subsection, we will
consider the case of symmetric shipping lines, i. e.  1 =  2 =  . Note that the di erence
between these approaches is easily modelled by looking at the following prot functions:
a) Post-merger situation a:   1 2 =   1  1 +   2  2    (  1 +   2)+ 
2( 2
 1 +  2
 2)
b) Post-merger situation b:   1 2 =   1  1 +   2  2    (  1 +   2)+ 
2(  1 +   2)2
c) Post-merger situation c:   1 2 =   1  1 +   2  2   ¯  (  1 +   2)+
¯  
2(  1 +   2)2  with
¯       and/or   ¯   
We will only consider situations   and   
-Situation a (without further economies of scale).
The new entity chooses the pair of prices (  1    2) to maximize   1 2 =   1  1+  2  2 
 (  1 +   2)+ 
2( 2
 1 +  2
 2)  Then, solving the system formed by
   1 2
   1 =0and    1 2
   2 =0  
we get that   
 1 =   
 2 =   
  =
  
    
( 1
1    )
4. Noting that   
  =    we obtain the equilibrium
prices   
  =( 1
(1  )   )
((  +   ) (1  ) )
(2 (1  ) ) +   At equilibrium the other relevant variables are
given by:
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-Situation b (with further economies of scale).
The new entity chooses the pair of prices (  1    2) to maximize   1 2 =   1  1+  2  2 
 (  1 +   2)+ 
2(  1 +   2)2  Then, solving for
   1 2
   1 =0and
   1 2
   1 =0   we get, for the
symmetric cost case, that   
 1 =   
 2 =   
  =
  
   
( 1
1   2 )
5. As above noting that   
  =   ,
the equilibrium shipping prices   
  =( 1
(1  )   2 )
((  +   ) (1  ) )
2(1 (1  ) ) +    The other relevant
4Global second order conditions are satised for   1  since   1  
2
1+ 2  which implies that the
determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive.
5As above global second order conditions are satised for   1  since   1  
2
(1  )2  and the
corresponding determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive as   1  
1
(1  ).
5variables are given by:
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We are rst interested in nding how shipping tra c evolves after one of the proposed
merger situations occurs. It is easy to prove the next result for the symmetric case  1 =
 2 =  .
Result 1: Either   
      
      
  if     (0 
 
1+ ),or   
      
      
  if     (
 
1+  1) 
The proof is straightforward just noting that   
  =
(  +   ) (1  ) 
1+(1  )(1  )     
  =
(  +   ) (1  ) 
(2 (1  ) )
and   
  =
(  +   ) (1  ) 
2(1 (1  ) )   then the ranking holds for 0       1 0       1
2  The merger with
only strategic e ect internalizes the competition among the shipping lines thus implying
a positive marginal prot at the pre-merger equilibrium price. Thus a higher price is
attained at the post-merger equilibrium and then output falls. Alternatively, if the merger
incorporates further scale e ects then the marginal prot after the merger includes a new
negative term that induces post-merger equilibrium prices to fall in case it dominates the
previous positive e ect, i.e. if   
 
1+   so that total output increases.
Note that for each merger situation to happen we need to ensure that it is privately
protable and also that the new entity nds it protable to keep both di erentiated services
operative. Private protability is ensured as long as 2  
  ( 1   2)     
 1 2 and 2  
  ( 1   2)  
  
 1 2  The next result ensures that both merger types are privately protable for  1 =  2 =
  :
Result 2: 2  
  (   )     
 1 2     
 1 2 
The proof is also straightforward. Just note that the merger with only strategic e ects
implies less output as compared with the initial situation, but the increase in market power
is enough to outweigh the output reduction with an increase in the margin thus leading
to greater prots. The merger with a better use of scale economies is even more protable
since it yields both an output and a margin increase at equilibrium. Also note that since
the long haul truck transport is a competitive industry, Result 2 proves that any of the
two types of merger increases rms’ prots.
6The next feature to evaluate is how the long haul tra c varies as a function of the
shipping line market structure.
Result 3: a)   
  is greater than both   
  and   
   b)   
  is greater than   
  if and only if
0       1
2(1  )}  otherwise   
  is greater than   
   with   1
2  and   1 
Since the long haul truck industry behaves in a competitive way, prices are not reacting
to the varying pricing conditions in the shipping line industry. Thus, nal long haul
output for each shipping line market structure is fully explained by the shipping line
prices. Therefore, the greater the equilibrium shipping line prices the higher the long haul
output. Since prices are higher in the merger with only strategic e ects as compared to
both the initial situation and the merger with further scale economies, then a merger with
only strategic e ects implies the higher level of truck transport. Whether the merger with
further economies of scale implies higher level of truck transport than the one in the initial
situation depends on either low   or high  .
Result 4: A su cient condition for           to hold is
 
1     and   
min{
2 
1    1
2(1  ))  Similarly a su cient condition for           is
 
1         1
2(1  ) 
The above result, which is directly obtained from Results 1 and 3, indicates that for
low levels of scale economies the merger with further economies of scale can generate an
increase in the equilibrium of both the maritime transport and long haul truck transport.
This is enough to lead to an increase in user and social surplus. Remind,    1
2(1  )
implies   
      
   and
 
1     implies   
      
    The consideration of   
2 
1   has to do
with the comparison between the second terms in the respective social welfare functions,
( 2




¢2 and (3  )(  
  )
2   If   
2 
1    then (2+(1  )(1 2 ))   (3  )(1  ) 
Result 5: A su cient condition for           is    ( )  where  ( ) increases in
    (  =0  3907570) = 0  and  (  = 1
2)=1  
The precise expression for  ( ) is
 2+ (5+9  4 2) 
 
4 20 +53 2 70 3+41 4+8 5+16 6
8(1  ) 2   Re-
sult 5 indicates that low levels of scale economies together with high cross elasticities imply
that the increase in the long haul transport induced by the merger more than compen-
sates the reduction in maritime transport so that aggregate user welfare increases and since
rms’ prots also increase, total welfare goes in the same direction. Finally and consider-
ing a symmetric situation in the sense that    =    and    =    we provide the necesary
and su cient condidions for     exceeds      In particular, for 0        ( ), where
 ( ) is an increasing function in     (  =0  251221) = 0 and  (  = 1
2) = 0 347296  Note
that  ( )=
 2+ (13   2 2) 
 
4 20 +53 2 74 3+53 4+12 5+4 6
4(1  ) 2   Given that, if   0 251221 
then           for all   while if   0 347296  then           for all   
73 Empirical application
In this section we are going to calibrate the theoretical model using actual data from
two particular routes between the Spanish port of Valencia and the ports of Antwerp and
Genoa. In boths routes there are two shipping lines which o er maritime freight transport
between the two ports, and both services are di erentiated. The average capacity is
slightly di erent, and more importantly, the frequency of the two companies for each
route is di erent as well. Besides we also have data about road tra c supplied by trucking
companies between the region of Valencia (Spain) and the region of Flandre (Belgium) and
the region of Liguria (Italy), respectively. In particular, the number of Tons transported
by road and by each shipping line in 2007 were the following:
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Regarding costs, the truck industry costs can be calculated from o cial data obtained
from “Observatorio del coste del transporte de mercancías por carretera 2008, Ministry of
Works”. Specically, the cost per vehicle km of a standard truck (carrying a 20 Tn capacity
container) is estimated to be 0.9  . We do not have any available data on maritime costs,
but we provide information about the average shipping prices for sending a 20 Tn container
between the ports of Valencia-Antwerp and Valencia-Genoa. This average price can be
obtained from an electronic simulator, a public program provided by the Spanish Ministry
of Works. Then the parameters   and   in the cost equation are calibrated in order to
obtain equilibrium prices similar to those provided by the simulator. The nal values used
for   and   are 0.55 and 0.1  per 20 Tn container km, respectively.
Finally, we need estimates for the own and cross-price elasticities. In the calibration
we will consider di erent elasticities for road and shipping transport, and therefore, we
will obtain values for the parameters in the demand expressions above. We employ the
data from the paper by Beuthe et al (2001):
[Insert Table 2 about here]
With all these data, the calibration follows a two stage process:
1. We rst identify the demand elasticities in the following asymmetric system:    =
¯           +¯  (  1 +   2)    1 =¯   1       1 +¯  (   +   2)    2 =¯   2       2 +¯  (  1 +   ).
Note that the model developed has assumed, for simplicity, symmetry in own e ects and
next a normalization of the coe cents so that the coe cients of prices are 1 and   
By expressing quantities and prices in logarithms, the coe cients are the values of the
elasticities. Therefore, a system of three equations with three unknowns can be solved to
obtain the values of       and  .
82. In the next step, values for ¯     ¯   1 and ¯   2 are calibrated. To do so, we take the
equilibrium expressions for quantities in the initial case and set them equal to the values of
20 Tn Container km transported (in logs). We can then solve a system of three equations
to estimate a value for ¯     ¯   1 and ¯   2.
With all these calibrated values we can obtain prices and quantities in logarithm, which
can be appropriately transformed in levels of   per container km and thousands of con-
tainers km. We can also calculate the results for the di erent scenarios. Table 3 column 1
reports the results for the initial case, whereas columns 2 and 3 report the results under
horizontal merger without and with further economies of scale.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
Firstly, we are going to comment the results for the route Valencia-Antwerp. In table 3,
  =0  1 stands for the situation where economies of scale are very important. In the event
of merger, this parameter represents around one third of total costs saving. We also assume
that   =0  6, thus considering that services are weakly di erentiated. Regarding the two
types of merger, prices increase and the aggregate prots of the merged shipping lines are
higher than the sum of prots before merger; the rms always have strong incentives to
merge. We also obtain that consumer surplus and social welfare are maximal in the merger
with no economies. This outcome is explained by the strong increase in freight tra c of
the competitive trucking sector. Finally, using data from INFRAS/IWW (2004), we can
estimate the negative externalities provoked by road and maritime freight transport. The
net social welfare, taking into account these estimates are reported in the last row.6 When
  =0  01 (see table 4 where   now represents a cost saving of 3.33% in the merger situation)
the results in terms of prices and tra c levels change slighlty as compared with table 3,
and therefore, the social gains of the merger (without and with further economies) are
always signicant.
However, when   =0  075 (see tables 5 and 6), this meaning that servicies between
road and shipping are clearly more di erentiated, the changes in prices and tra c levels
are very small with respect to the pre-merger scenario. Now the social gains from the
merger are lower, and again these gains are, as expected, more relevant when the shipping
lines can better exploit their economies of scale. Social welfare in the pre-merger regime
and the merger regime without further economies are now very similar in tables 5 and 6.
6We have considered that the average externality cost transported by a 20 Tn truck container is 1.42
  per km. The same number of tons transported by shipping lines supposes 0.45   per km.
9[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
Secondly, regarding the second route, Valencia-Genoa, the results are qualitatively
similar to those obtained for the route Valencia-Antwerp (see tables 7 to 10). Again the
social gains are higher in the merger scenarios when the services provided by road and
shipping lines are less di erentiated. Summing up, we can conclude that product di en-
tiation (approximated by the parameter of cross elasticity) seems more relevant in our
results than the parameter of economies of scale.
[Insert Tables 7 to 10 about here]
4 Conclusions
We have developed a theoretical model where the maritime sector, assumed oligopolistic,
competes for freight transport with a competitive road transport industry. Attention is
drawn to product di erentiation and the size of economies of scale in the characterization
of market equilibrium without and with horizontal integration between shipping lines. It is
shown that maritime freight increases after the merger in case it entails further economies
of scale. In case prices for maritime services increase, which occurs when the merger
only has a strategic e ect, road freight transport also increases. Furthermore, under some
conditions, horizontal integration is found to be benecial in private and social terms.
In the empirical application we have employed data for two freight routes between the
hinterland of Valencia and the hinterlands of Genoa and Antwerp. The results show that,
in all cases examined, the shipping lines have strong incentives to merge. Additionally, a
merger (horizontal integration) between two shipping lines where economies of scale are
further exploited generally leads to an increase in social welfare. Also, in most of the
cases, the merger produces a signicant increase in road tra c, which is greater than the
reduction in tra c transported by the shipping lines, and this fact leads to an increase in
user surplus. We have obtained that the social gains depend mainly of the characteristics
of the market. Then the social gains obtained with the merger are higher in those markets
where the road and shipping services are less di erentiated. If the services are clearly
di erentiated, then the social gains are signicantly lower.
There are many possible extensions that we wish to undertake in the future. It would be
interesting to analyze the situation if the trucking companies do not behave competitively.
Also we would like to study the possibility that lines can share the capacity of their
vessels, instead of supplying its own ones. Also it is interesting to consider asymmetric
costs, incorporating, for instance, economies in the size of the vessels. And nally, the
10analysis of potential vertical integration, for example, between some trucking companies
and the shipping lines is another line of future research.
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Table 1. Number of tons transported  
  Valencia-Antwerp Valencia-Genoa 
Trucking companies 590490 25914
Shipping line 1  73561 24562
Shipping line 2  207976 53487
Total  872027 103963
 
 
Table 2. Values of elasticities 
Road own price elasticity  -1.31 
Shipping own price elasticity  -1.38 





Table 3. VALENCIA-ANTWERP. Results with   = 0.1 and cross elasticity = 0.6 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.558 0.759 0.714






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
11,938.9 8,749.1 9,548.6






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
141.1
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
2,490.4
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
3,305.9 3,444.6
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
65,669.6 98,678.6 92,123.6
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
68,301.2 101,984.5 95,568.2
Externalities  9,602.7 11,920.5 11,554.3
Net social welfare  58,698.5 90,064.5 84,013.9
 Table 4. VALENCIA-ANTWERP. Results with   = 0.01 and cross elasticity =0.6 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.567 0.761 0.756






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
11,938.9 8,911.9 8,987.9






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
87.7
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
2,395.2
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
3,248.3 3,263.6
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
65,559.6 96.988.8 96,351.5
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
68,152.5 100,237.1 99,615.1
Externalities  9,602.7 11,823.6 11,788.4




 Table 5. VALENCIA-ANTWERP. Results with   = 0.1 and cross elasticity = 0.075 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.559 0.574 0.538






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
11,938.9 11,499.6 12,577.4






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
141.1
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
2,490.3
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
2,645.1 3,038.8
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
15,527.8 15,500.0 15,563.3
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
18,159.9 18,145.1 18,602.1
Externalities  9,602.7 9,593.5 9,615.4
Net social welfare  8,557.2 8,551.6 8,986.7
  
Table 6. VALENCIA-ANTWERP. Results with   = 0.01 and cross elasticity = 0.075 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.567 0.582 0.579






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
11,938.9 11,499.6 11,623.1






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
87.7
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
2,395.2
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
2,505.0 2,539.2
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
15,527.7 15,500.7 15,502.2
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
18,010.6 18,005.7 18,041.4
Externalities  9,602.7 9,593.9 9,595.2






Table 7. VALENCIA-GENOA. Results with   = 0.1 and cross elasticity  = 0.6 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.514 0.629 0.603






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
1,043.88 851.26 903.26






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
69.56
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
1,081.45
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
1,418.79 1,566.76
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
16,050.10 17,289.70 16,557.60
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
17,201.11 18,708.49 18,124.36
Externalities  3,753.92 4,103.49 4,035.71
Net social welfare  13,447.19 14,605.00 14,088.65
  
Table 8. VALENCIA-GENOA. Results with   = 0.01 and cross elasticity  = 0.6 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.516 0.625 0.623






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
1,043.88 861.55 866.54






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
22.61
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
999.24
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
1,311.84 1,327.23
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
16,050.10 17,146.90 17,073.10
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
17,071.95 18,458.74 18,400.33
Externalities  3,753.92 4,087.43 4,080.83
Net social welfare  13,318.03 14,371.31 14,319.50
 
 
 Table 9. VALENCIA-GENOA. Results with   = 0.1 cross elasticity  =0.075 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.514 0.523 0.513






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
1,043.88 1,017.78 1,081.35






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
68.67
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
1,020.12
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
1,097.62 1,322.35
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
3,256.85 3,235.63 3,284.96
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
4,345.65 4,333.25 4,607.31
Externalities  3,753.92 3,744.39 3,766.92
Net social welfare  591.73 588.86 840.39
  
Table 10. VALENCIA-GENOA. Results with   = 0.01 and cross elasticity  =0.075 
  No merger  Merger (no further 
economies) 
Merger (with further 
economies) 
Truck price (€ per 
container-km) 
0.900 0.900 0.900
Price line 1 (€ per 
container-km) 
0.516 0.525 0.522






Line 1 quantity 
(thousands) 
1,043.88 1,019.39 1,025.20






Profits line 1 
(thousands of €) 
21.71
Profits line 2 
(thousands of €) 
933.20
Profits merge 
(thousands of €) 
966.139 986.99
User Surplus 
(thousands of €) 
3,256.85 3,236.59 3,239.71
Social welfare 
(thousands of €) 
4,211.77 4,202.73 4,226.71
Externalities  3,753.92 3,744.89 3,746.63
Net social welfare  457.85 457.83 480.08
 
 
 
 
 